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THE FI FUNCTION ON A TASK FORCE

INTRODUCTION

1. A Task Force is an organization established to accomplish a mission of a magnitude beyond the capabilities of existing organization units; or which must be pursued without undue disruption of day to day operations of such units. Task Forces are established for many purposes. It is possible that intelligence objectives could dominate the need for Task Force action. Often in the instance of ultimate political action or paramilitary objectives, well-defined intelligence (FI and CI) objectives must first be satisfied by Task Force action. For purposes of this discussion, FI activity will be largely concerned with the collection of intelligence information and will be discussed in terms of a Task Force with a predominately paramilitary objective.

2. Since the size and mission of the Task Force will appreciably affect both the size and organization of the intelligence function, our attention will be devoted in large measure to those activities which support or are pursued in execution of the positive intelligence function, irrespective of organization alignment. There must be cases where one man served adequately as the Intelligence Officer. Starting on this fundamental, there can be any number of approaches to the design of the intelligence structure in the Task Force. Suffice it to say that the intelligence function is present at each level of Task Force activity although it may lose its specialized identification in the forward echelons. Moreover, the FI (positive) aspect of intelligence are inextricably joined with its CI counterpart. Likewise, the FI function is

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highly inter-dependent <sup>with</sup> its political action and psywar sisters, when Task Force objectives dictate and command orders the blending of functions.

3. Under actual or even quasi- hot-war conditions the positive intelligence function individually supports the activity of each of the other specializations contained in the Task Force. Collectively, the intelligence function supplies that information, analyses, and estimation from which Task Force leaders plan a campaign encompassing the entire target area and have readily at hand those data necessary for specific operations against selected targets in defined localities. The requests for information go forward as requirements; are collected through the facilities and sources presently available to the Task Force; are analysed on the spot; and are then incorporated into the working body of information from which Task Force officers draw for planning and action purposes.

#### CHARACTER OF THE INFORMATION REQUIRED BY TASK FORCE COMPONENTS

Since intelligence effort is concentrated on the target area, detailed information will be needed to meet the needs of the specializations within the Task Force.

1. Cartographic intelligence support. Paramilitary operations rely heavily on maps and charts. Field requirements must be met promptly and reserve stocks built up for future demands. The accuracy of the information at hand must be verified and significant changes brought about through climatic, military or social upheaval must be identified through Task Force collection action.

2. Photographic intelligence. Many operations require prior study of photographs of the target and terrain. Requirements for coverage not at hand must be levied.

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3. Biographic Intelligence. Agency experience has shown that in almost every instance requiring Task Force action, the most perplexing, frustrating and time consuming problem is the identification, description, and assessment of those with or through whom we will direct Task Force action. Likewise needed is an examination of the opposition members and their approaches to our prospective indigenous Task Force partners and to the uncommitted neutrals. Indeed, a short-term, concentrated collation and analysis of existing biographic information may be needed prior to formulation of Task Force plans. In this collation process the gaps become apparent. While these requirements are cranked into existing <sup>collection</sup> machinery, the Task Force would be in process of organization. Results of collection action will then flow back to the newly-organized Task Force. From here the intelligence function of the Task Force concentrates in the biographic area on localized objectives which might include among others:

- a. Identification and assessment of uncommitted indigenous individuals who would be susceptible to recruitment for Task Force action.
- b. Monitoring and continuous assessment of indigenous leaders with whom we have joined to stay informed on motivation, capacity, ability, relationships, etc. of these individuals.
- c. Establishing the strengths, vulnerabilities and relationships of the opposition leaders.
- d. Identification, assessment and access to prospective unilateral agents who can be used to verify information otherwise collected and can be used to penetrate the internal organization of our indigenous counterparts.

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4. Tactical Intelligence. This information is obtained through day to day, detailed reporting on order of battle (enemy) and deployment of friendly forces. Generally, this information is immediately transferred to order of battle boards and files.

5. Political, Economic and Psychological Intelligence. The fluidity of a situation in which a Task Force is employed presents a complex picture in which it is difficult to identify the intentions and sometimes even the political character of the incumbent government and the opposition groups. Sometimes of equal importance is a similar picture of political events in neighboring countries. The personal and nationalistic objectives of indigenous leaders and their manipulation of international tensions to achieve these ends through political, economic and psychological means further complicates the picture. For Task Force tactical planning purposes and for provision of such economic and psychological support as is needed by the Task Force, on-the-spot collection of information on objectives, intentions, and ambitions of political groups <sup>is</sup> are needed to supplement that collection taking place within the total U.S. collection apparatus. In addition to the political action needs, this information is needed by the psychological action operations which are designed to influence the mood, morale and actions of the target peoples in favor of Task Force activity. Yet, within this collection effort care must be taken to limit the collection activity to that which is of specific importance to the Task Force and to that which can be properly processed and utilized within the limited capabilities of the Task Force.

#### SOURCES AND FACILITIES EMPLOYED

intelligence

All Governmental and Agency/facilities must be made available to support Task Force objectives. This coordination would be accomplished within the Headquarters structure.

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1. Basic Intelligence. Appropriate National Intelligence Surveys, maps, charts, intelligence summaries and like reference materials should be as close to the scene of action as the logistical situation permits.

2. Special Intelligence. Much of the most valuable information on the target area, especially if it is, as is usually the case, a denied or semi-denied one, will come from Special Intelligence. The Task Force will have the responsibility for the secure handling of Special Intelligence and for seeing to it that maximum usage, within security limitations, is ensured.

3. Headquarters and other Off-the-Scene Support. Each step back from the forward echelon will have progressively larger bodies of information from which Task Force requirements can be satisfied. The Field Base has more than the Special Action team; the local station has more than the Field Base; Headquarters has more than the field station. The value of the information held by each of these establishments will be largely determined by the communication facilities and by the capacity of the holders of the information to service priority Task Force requests. The Task Force should undertake clandestine collection of information only if existing deadlines or communication facilities negate the servicing of the requirement from such information.

4. The Clandestine Services Collection Mechanism. Task Force requirements which cannot be answered on the scene, e. g., concurrent United Nations action, or third country intervention, must be dispatched to Headquarters with priority designation and be accomplished through the existing (Agency) mechanism.

5. Indigenous Groups. Since a Task Force is organized to perform a covert mission, its Agency officers will, of necessity, be severely restricted in their movement and exposure by security and cover restrictions. Intelligence

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collection must be largely achieved through the indigenous groups with whom we have joined to achieve Task Force objectives. The Task Force case officer (who in actuality may be a paramilitary officer) communicates his requirements to his indigenous counterpart who, in fact, acts as our principal agent. It is this principal agent who organizes the collection net and it is he through whom answers are received. The Task Force officer's job not only includes the consolidation and communication of requirements, but the much more difficult job of directing and training this principal agent in the rudiments of tradecraft, security, agent management, and reporting, complete with source evaluation in rapidly developing situations. The principal agent may be required to contribute to the evaluation of the information itself. Whereas the Paramilitary officer to achieve guerilla or resistance operations objectives can arrange to bring the indigenous action agents into camp for face-to-face training, the nature and procedures for clandestine collection usually leave no choice but that of working through a principal agent.

6. Liaison and Penetration Agents. The smallness, unity of purpose, clandestinity, drama, immediacy and action implicit in the Task Force provides a milieu for unilateral clandestine collection through liaison and penetration of the friendly forces with whom we have joined. The satisfaction of outstanding requirements will often call/for the use of each Task Force member who has personal exchange with the officers of Friendly Forces and each should be aware of the requirements he might service and of opportunities within his exchange for satisfaction of outstanding requirements. Liaison may be asked to service positive task force requirements, as well as to verify

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information provided by the principal agents, to service CI requirements on internal machination and to furnish stay-behind assets.

#### INTELLIGENCE TASKS

Within the Task Force the tasks associated with the intelligence function run the gamut of Headquarters intelligence activity. These would include:

1. The mounting and management of positive collection operations as described above.
2. The mounting and handling of counter-intelligence operations, including defection. (This will be spelled out more fully in examination of the CI function.)
3. The translation of Task Force information needs (PM, CA, CI, Support) into collection requirements suited to collector's capacities and the subsequent transmission of the requirements to the specified collectors. This would include provision of requirements for paramilitary assets capable of producing information.
4. The dissemination of information obtained to pertinent Task Force elements.
5. The amassment and collation of existing data on target area and personalities. The nearer the unit to the front lines the more important this task becomes. The Task Force Field Base and even more important the Action Teams cannot afford to be weighted down with unorganized paper or information.
6. The maintenance of liaison with Headquarters, other Agency units, U. S. Services and foreign services to obtain information in satisfaction of Task Force requirements and to place into appropriate channels information



acquired through Task Force action which will be useful outside of Task Force jurisdiction. However, it should be noted that the Task Force should not be used to collect in response to governmental as opposed to Task Force requirements. Its contribution to the other components of Government could be considered to be expedient or gratuitous.

7. From analysis of existing data, the drawing of conclusions and the assessment of probability in future events.

8. The maintenance of an Intelligence Watch; like maintenance of Order of Battle boards, situation rooms, and files; the briefing of the Task Force Commander and other responsible officers as need dictates.

9. The preparation of Intelligence Annexes and Target Studies for Operational Plans together with summaries or special studies as needed.

10. The provision of secure handling and processing for Special Intelligence.

11. Provision for the prompt transmission of information through the Communications Section.

#### CONCLUSIONS

Here it might be well to consider how the intelligence function differs in the Task Force concept from the normal day-to-day, country-by-country collection of information.

1. Limitations. The Task Force is a small organization in which many specializations are present and must be served. Only so much information can be collected and only so much information can be handled by the limited personnel in the Task Force. Of necessity, Task Force intelligence collection action is limited to that information required to meet specific Task Force objectives. It is localized and concentrated on the target area and personali-



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ties. Positive collection action is in the large limited by the sources the indigenous principal agents can recruit. Likewise, the collection results are influenced by the capacity of the indigenous principal agent to report.

2. Compulsive Factors. In a rapidly developing situation, the Task Force cannot suspend action in the absence of information. It must act on the basis of that which is available. The urgency of the moment will influence both the collection and evaluation of the information. The considered analysis of new events through the Headquarters intelligence processing facilities may not be possible. The intelligence function must then make provision within the limits of the Task Force Commanders frame of reference for the completion of the intelligence cycle by providing some form of intelligence analysis as a basis not only for executive or military action but also for the assumption of political risk.

3. Extraneous Factors. Those factors over which we have no control but which will influence the intelligence function on the Task Force include: The fluid political and military scene which may prevail; the targeting of the Task Force at a denied or semi-denied area; the security and cover required to conceal a Task Force as opposed to that required for an individual's clandestine activities.

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